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Forget the Transnational State
Mindsets … are exceedingly difficult to break even when 
confronted with logical inconsistencies and problems of 
empirical validity [Robinson, 2004, p. 93]
Introduction
William Robinson has argued energetically  over  recent  years  that  the  rise  of 
transnational  capital  is leading to the emergence of a ‘transnational  capitalist 
class’ (TCC) and a ‘transnational state’ (TNS).1 He argues that we are in a period 
of transition from the ‘nation-state phase of world capitalism … to a transnational 
phase’ [Robinson, 2004: 5]; anyone who thinks otherwise is a victim of ‘nation-
state centrism’ – a mindset they need to abandon [ibid: 93]. But the ‘summary 
statement’ of his work on globalization from which these phrases are taken – 
largely a compilation from earlier essays – is full of logical inconsistencies, and 
offers little evidence in support of the case for a ‘transnational state’, despite his 
having promised before and acknowledged since that it might be time to provide 
some [Robinson, 2002, p. 500; 2005b, p. 5]. So I argue here that it is time for 
Robinson  to  abandon his  own  ‘transnationalist’  mindset,  and  accept  the  less 
arresting but more persuasive conclusion that national states have a changing 
but continuing role in the global capitalist system, one in which they are oriented 
and supported by an increasingly interlocked network of global institutions that 
do  not  show  any  tendency  to  evolve  into  a  transnational  state  [Cammack, 
2006c]. The idea of such a state is an unnecessary and unhelpful diversion, and 
a barrier to understanding, and should be renounced. 
Global capitalism
Robinson identifies  himself  with  the  global  capitalism thesis  or  school,  which 
argues that ‘globalization represents a new stage in the evolving world capitalist 
system that came into being some five centuries ago’, and ‘can be explained 
largely  by a methodologically  prior,  materialist  theory  of  capitalism’  [2].2 His 
1 Prior to the monograph examined here [Robinson 2004], see for example Robinson 1998, 2000, 
2002. Subsequent to it, see Robinson 2005a, 2005b, 2006.
2 He identifies four epochs in the history of capitalism: mercantilism and primitive accumulation 
(1492-1789); competitive or classical capitalism (1789-late C19th); ‘corporate (“monopoly”) 
capitalism’ (late C19th-1970s); and ‘globalization’, still in its early phases [4-5].
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initial  theoretical  formulation  of  globalization  does  not  invoke  the  idea  of 
transnationalism,  but  states  that  it  ‘can  essentially  be  seen  as  the  near 
culmination of  a centuries-long process  of  the spread of  capitalist  production 
around  the  world  and  its  displacement  of  all  precapitalist  relations,  bringing 
about a new form of connection between all human beings around the world’ [2]: 
by the early twenty-first century the vast majority of peoples around 
the world had been integrated into the capitalist market and brought 
into capitalist production relations. No countries or regions remained 
outside of world capitalism, and there were no longer any pre- or non-
capitalist modes of production on a significant scale [6].
Underlying this perspective is his argument that the essence of capitalism is 
‘production undertaken through a particular form of social interaction, what I will 
call  the  capital-labor  relation (or  capitalist  production  relations),  in  order  to 
exchange what is produced, commodities, in a market for profit’ [5].3 He argues 
on this basis that
Capitalist production relations are replacing what remains of 
precapitalist relations around the globe. The era of the primitive 
accumulation of capital is coming to an end. Those cultural and 
political institutions that fettered capitalism are being swept aside, 
paving the way for the total commodification, or marketization, of 
social life worldwide [7].
These claims (all at the very least misleading, as we shall shortly see) underpin 
his  argument  that  globalization  represents  a  shift  from  a  world to  a  global 
economy, ‘a new, transnational phase in the development of the world capitalist 
system, [a] defining feature [of which] is the rise of transnational capital’ [9].
However,  this  is  a  flawed  hybrid  perspective,  which  grafts  onto  a  garbled 
version of the Marxist understanding of capitalism as ‘essentially a production 
relation’  [8]  an  incompatible  conception  of  transnationalism  taken  from  the 
contemporary sociology of globalization (and in particular from Castells, Dicken 
and Sklair, who feature prominently as sources and interlocutors throughout). 
And  because  the  understanding  of  the  ‘capital-labour  relation’  he  employs  is 
defective, the graft does not take. 
In talking as he does of peoples around the world being ‘brought into capitalist 
production relations’ Robinson ignores the vital distinction between the  formal 
and the real subsumption (or subjection) of labour to capital. It is one thing for 
forms of production which arise outside capitalism to be brought under its control 
3 ‘The capital-labor relation is the relationship between workers and capitalists as they come 
together in the process of producing goods that people want or need’ [5].
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– as for example in the use ‘global capital’  makes of informal sector activity, 
home-working, or patriarchal sweatshops. Capital in this case appropriates the 
product, but the production process itself is not ‘the specifically capitalist mode 
of production in its developed form’.4 That is to say, it does not feature ‘factory 
production’  –  the  revolutionary  development  which  features  the  increasing 
application of machinery (capital) to the production process, rising productivity, 
and a fundamental  switch in the character of  exploitation (and the source of 
profit) from the extraction of absolute surplus value to the extraction of relative 
surplus value. There is an enormous difference, which Robinson’s use of the term 
‘capital-labour relation’ to cover both situations overlooks, between the capitalist 
appropriation of home-working or informal sector production (which is certainly a 
feature of global commodity chains), and the installation of factory production 
and the specifically capitalist dynamic of the increasing application of capital to 
the production process itself (which may or may not be, and often is not).5 Once 
this distinction is introduced, Robinson’s argument falls to pieces. 
First, there is no universal ‘new global capital-labor relation’ [19]: the claim that 
‘capitalist  production  relations  are  replacing  what  remains  of  precapitalist 
relations  around  the  globe’  conflates  two  fundamentally  different  processes, 
assuming  homogeneity  where  in  fact  heterogeneity  still  prevails.  Robinson 
presents no evidence to suggest that the production networks and commodity 
chains he talks about feature capitalist relations of production’ in their developed 
form’  throughout.  He  can’t,  because  they  don’t.  He  talks  instead  about  ‘the 
global  casualization  or  informalization  of  labour’,  which  ‘involves  alternative 
systems of labor control and diverse contingent categories of labor’  [19] – in 
other words, he acknowledges the diversity of the social relations of production 
involved.6
4 Marx [1976], p. 1019.
5 ‘With the production of relative surplus-value the entire real form of production is altered and a 
specifically capitalist form of production comes into being (at the technological level too). Based 
on this, and simultaneously with it, the corresponding relations of production between the various 
agents of production and above all between the capitalist and the wage-labourer, come into being 
for the first time’ [ibid., p. 1024]. The definition of the global proletariat that Robinson adopts 
from Hardt and Negri ignores this distinction. They define it as ‘a broad category that includes all 
those whose labor is directly and indirectly exploited by and subject to capitalist norms of 
production and reproduction’ (cited p. 44 from Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 52; emphasis mine). 
6 Robinson adds later, in a passage laden with examples of reliance on the extraction of absolute 
surplus value, that ‘Well-known trends associated with the restructuring of the labor-capital 
relation taking place under globalization include “downward levelling,” deunionization, “ad hoc” 
and “just-in-time” labor supply, the superexploitation of immigrant communities as a counterpart 
to capital export, the lengthening of the working day, the rise of a new global “underclass” of 
supernumeraries or “redundants” subject to new forms of social control, and new gendered and 
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Transnationalization may involve ‘the functional integration of .. internationally 
dispersed activities’ [14] but it  doesn’t necessarily involve the universalization of 
the  capital-labour  relation  specific  to  capitalism.  Robinson  draws  on  Castells’ 
notion of the ability of the global economy ‘to work as a single unit in real time, 
making  possible  simultaneity  and  therefore  real  organic  integration’,  and 
Dicken’s contrast between shallow and deep integration of the global economy 
[14], but he does not substantiate the claim that ‘globalization is unifying the 
world into a single mode of production’ [15].7
Third, it is misleading to claim that the ‘cultural and political institutions that 
fettered  capitalism  are  being  swept  aside,  paving  the  way  for  the  total 
commodification, or marketization, of social life worldwide’. By presenting this as 
a process which is irreversibly under way, Robinson again skips over the issue of 
the agency behind the process. Yet in much of the world existing social relations, 
sustained by powerful cultural and political institutions, still stand in the way of 
the universalisation of the ‘specifically capitalist mode of production’; and ‘global 
capital’ often supports, perpetuates and benefits from them.
Fourth, then, Robinson is wrong to claim that a shift is taking place from a 
world to a global economy, if by this he means that whereas in the past world 
economy nation-states ‘mediated the boundaries between a world of different 
national economies and articulated modes of production’, now they do not [10]. 
This fundamentally misleading suggestion arises from looking only at the alleged 
opposition between national and transnational fractions of capital, and forgetting 
for the moment the crucial  role that national states still  play in enforcing the 
hegemony of capital over labour within their own territories.
Transnationalism and the transnational state
Robinson’s  argument  depends  simultaneously,  then,  on  two  diametrically 
racialized hierarchies among labor’ [102].
7 For this reason, the case Robinson makes for the claim that we are living in a new epoch is not 
persuasive. I argue that we are indeed living in such an epoch, but one characterized by a 
dynamic of global competitiveness [Cammack, 2003, 2006c]. The global project espoused by the 
international institutions is addressed explicitly to the real subsumption of labour to capital and the 
increased extraction of relative surplus value on a global scale. But individual capitalists, including 
those at the centre of the advanced capitalist countries, still resort to all means available in their 
pursuit of profit and of competitiveness, including continued and in some cases increased reliance 
on very primitive methods of production. Similarly, it is no paradox that while the international 
institutions rail against bribery and corruption, major transnational corporations continue to 
employ it on a massive scale, with the tacit and sometimes explicit support of their governments. 
These are simply indications of the contradictions of global capitalism, reflecting both the dynamics 
of uneven and combined development, and the relative autonomy of the international institutions 
and their project from particular existing capitals.
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opposed  understandings  of  the  idea  of  ‘transnationalism’  –  one  narrow  and 
specific, allegedly deriving from classical Marxism, and centred on the idea of the 
spread of  ‘global  capital’  and of  strictly  capitalist  relations  of  production;  the 
other  broad  and  general,  deriving  from  the  contemporary  sociology  of 
globalization, and including all manner of practices and processes not contained 
within borders. His argument hinges on the first, but his ‘evidence’ relates to the 
second, though even here it  does not go beyond the entirely uncontroversial 
claim that capitalist production is no longer ‘national’ in character. 
So although he prefaces his review of the empirical evidence for his argument 
with  the  statement  that  ‘we  need  to  focus  on  the  production  relations  that 
underpin market relations and the social forces that drive production relations in 
order to identify what is qualitatively new in the current epoch’ [22], he looks at 
neither. Instead, he takes FDI as a proxy for transnational production, on the 
grounds that by definition it ‘transnationalizes production’ [22]. Well, it depends 
what you mean. There is case to be made (indeed, Marx made it) that foreign 
investment introduces capitalist relations of production into societies where they 
do not  prevail,  but  Robinson  does  not  pursue it.  Instead he throws into  his 
conception  of  transnationalization  TNC  reliance  on  local  sources  of  funding, 
outsourcing and subcontracting [22-3; cf. 54], and the fact that world exports 
have been growing faster than world production [24], now arguing after all he 
has said about production that ‘[t]rade and FDI are in many respects the most 
important mechanisms of globalization and transnational integration’ [23]. The 
focus  has  already switched from the universalization  of  capitalist  relations  of 
production to the integration of different regions into the world market.
Even here, though, the pattern of integration proves highly skewed. Remarking 
that world FDI inflows reached $1.27 trillion in 2000, Robinson notes that some 
80 per cent of this total was concentrated in North America, Europe and Japan. 
He  does  not  consider  the  implication  that  only  a  minor  proportion  of  FDI  is 
potentially effecting a revolution in relations of production around the world, and 
that if anything the differential patterns of investment might be reinforcing rather 
than effacing heterogeneity. The same point applies to the data he later provides 
on cross-border mergers as evidence of the emergence of the TCC [57-62].
Turning to trade, Robinson argues that the growing significance of TNC-initiated 
or intra-firm trade is further evidence of globalized production, but states again 
that much of it involves subcontracting, licensing, franchising and outsourcing 
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[28]. All well and good. But the issue on which this evidence is intended to bear 
is the production relations that underpin market relations, and the social forces 
which drive them. Never mind that Robinson also concedes that ‘the majority of 
trade in the world  still takes place within rather than across national boundaries’ 
[29]. Damaging though that is to the argument, the more important point is that 
there is nothing to support the proposition that the social relations of production 
around the world are reaching a point of virtually total transformation, such that 
capitalist relations of production proper are dominant. 
No  one  will  doubt  that  the  developments  in  global  production,  trade  and 
investment  which  Robinson  describes  have  consequences  for  relations  of 
production around the world. But having first announced that this is his concern, 
Robinson makes no effort to investigate it, instead counting a whole range of 
different forms of production as falling within the ambit of ‘transnational capital’. 
Is FDI originating in the ‘capitalist core’ having a transformative effect on the 
social relations of production in ‘peripheral’ or ‘developing’ economies? To what 
extent do such economies exhibit an increase in strictly capitalist  relations of 
production? What proportion of the global workforce is subject to such relations 
of  production,  and  how  is  it  distributed?  What  evidence  is  there  for  the 
proposition that global  capitalists wish to see all ‘non-capitalist’ forms of labour 
eliminated?  Such  evidence  as  he  presents  actually  goes  against  him,  as  he 
appears to think himself  that  capital  benefits  from such heterogeneity  in  the 
global system.8 
Worse still,  Robinson’s subsequent presentation of empirical  evidence of TCC 
formation revolves around exactly the same material (sometimes, as at pp. 19-
20 and 68, repeated word for word) – the spread of TNCs in the developed and 
developing  world,  cross-border  mergers  and  alliances  (almost  entirely  in  the 
developed  world),  interlocking  directorates,  and  strategic  alliances.  Further 
evidence of the global reach of capital, but, as Robinson himself tells us, not 
sufficient ‘to prove the existence of a TCC’ [54].
What can we make, then, of the claims made for the ‘transnational capitalist 
class’?  As Robinson himself reminds us [35-7], the idea of a capitalist class that 
has transcended national boundaries and operates on a global scale is not new. 
8 For example, he argues that the mobility of capital allows it ‘to search out the most favourable 
conditions for different phases of globalized production, including the cheapest labour, the most 
favourable institutional environment (e.g., low taxes) and regulatory conditions (e.g. lax 
environmental and labor laws, a stable social environment, and so on’ [22]. 
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What is at issue, then, is what is new in what he has to tell us about it – the 
context out of which it emerges, the interests it has, its degree of coherence, its 
capacity to  act as a class, and the manner in which it relates to the state. As we 
shall see, in each of these areas his only idea is that of the ‘supersession’ of the 
national  state (although the claim is no sooner made in each area than it  is 
retracted), and on each the approach taken is one-dimensional, mechanistic and 
reductionist.  He  is  unable  to  convince  us  that  capitalists  no  longer  have  an 
interest in the national state, and he does not even try to demonstrate that they 
have a capacity to act as a class beyond it.
First, as noted above, Robinson reduces the issue of bourgeois class identity 
and interest to an opposition between national and transnational class fractions 
[37, 49], and argues that ‘as the entire circuit [of capital accumulation] becomes 
transnationalized,  so  too  do  classes,  political  processes,  states,  and  cultural-
ideological processes’ [39]. There is a huge confusion here (parallel to that over 
the formal versus real subsumption of labour to capital) which originates in the 
notion  that  the  link  between  production  and  territory  has  been  broken.  As 
Robinson develops the argument that the capitalist class is ‘increasingly less tied 
to territoriality or driven by national competition’ [36] he talks as if production 
had become extra-terrestrial rather than spread across numerous territories. In 
doing so, he momentarily tricks himself into thinking that capitalists (however 
much or little they might be identified with a particular nation state) have no 
interest in the  local state in any territory in which they are active. Rather, the 
TCC has ‘an objective class existence and identity in the global system above any 
local territories and politics’ [47, emphasis mine]. As much else of what he has to 
say  shows clearly,  he  does  not  actually  think  this  all  the  time.  But  the  fact 
remains, dispute it as he might, that the argument for a ‘transnational capitalist 
class’  depends  upon  the  bizarre  notion  that  its  activity  has  become  de-
territorialized.9 He is quite right to make the uncontroversial point that the idea 
of a ‘national bourgeoisie’ does not capture much of the reality of contemporary 
political  economy,  but  quite  wrong  to  assume that  this  means  that  the  link 
between  capitalists  and  national  (local)  states  is  severed,  or  that  capital  is 
somehow ‘liberated from the nation-state’ [39].
Second, he falls all the more readily into this error because although he dates 
9 Thus Robinson refers to ‘transnational or deterritorialized’ class interests [53], and argues that 
transnationalization ‘disembeds [national capitals] from their locations and locates them in new 
supranational space’ [54].
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the period of state-centrism from the Treaty of Westphalia [90], in practice he 
reduces the national state, in its relation to capitalism and the bourgeoisie, to the 
Fordist-Keynesian interventionist state (or the developmental state in the Third 
World),  and  mistakenly  interprets  the  ‘end’  of  this  state  as  the  end  of  the 
national  state  altogether.  The  logic  is  crudely  mechanistic  –  the  ‘national 
bourgeoisie’ needed the Fordist-Keynesian state to guarantee the conditions for 
national accumulation  and  legitimation,  but  now  that  transnational  capital  is 
dominant, there is no need for it any more.10 However, the role of the national 
state in guaranteeing the conditions of accumulation and legitimation (or, rather, 
in seeking to do so, if  it  so happens that that is what it  does) goes beyond 
arbitrating  between ‘national’  and ‘global’  capital,  and in  general  beyond the 
specific form it takes at a particular place and time. And Robinson is actually well 
aware that local/national states do indeed still seek to secure these conditions, 
and  that  they  do  so  now,  increasingly,  through  neoliberal  strategies  in  the 
context of ‘post-Fordism’.
The  tension  this  equivocation  over  the  continued  role  of  the  national  state 
generates for Robinson’s ‘transnational’ theory is precisely reflected in the way in 
which he alternates between the claim that it has been superseded [45, 46, 90-
92]  and  the  very  different  claim  that  it  has  been  modified,  reorganised  or 
transformed [50, 74, 75, 100, 121-125]. He recognises that the national state 
still mediates class relations in a way that is fundamental for capital, global or 
otherwise, when he states that ‘the mediating element of national states has 
been modified’ [43], and when he notes that ‘the principal social contradiction is 
still between dominant and subordinate classes’ [53]. He recognises it, too, when 
he charts the shift from welfare and developmentalist to neoliberal states around 
the  world  [121-5].  But  he  forgets  it  when  he  chides  realists,  world-system 
analysts and Marxists alike with thinking that ‘hegemony is inextricably tied up 
with state power, and state power is conceived in terms of the nation-state’ [76], 
giving as his reason only the obsolescence of the idea of the global system as a 
‘competing nation-state system’ [77]. This comes of drinking too deep from the 
10 There is a telling hiatus in the development of the argument on this point. Robinson is clear that 
national Fordism and the associated Fordist class compromise is defunct. But his account of its 
demise, which invokes Polanyi’s notion of the ‘double movement’, breaks off when he reaches the 
‘first movement’ of the great neoliberal transformation, or the ‘maturation of transnational 
capitalism’. He does not go on at this point to consider whether this shift might be followed by a 
‘second movement’, or in other words by a global Fordist class compromise [40-44]. When he 
does, over a hundred pages later [163-8], he is disappointingly agnostic.
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spring  of  international  political  economy  (Cox  appears  to  figure  here  as  a 
representative ‘Marxist’), and overlooking for the moment the different emphasis 
of  a  Marxist  approach.  Here  as  elsewhere,  he  can only  see  what  his  flawed 
methodology  will  let  him  see.  Once  he  opts  to  relocate  global  capital  to  an 
imagined  ‘new  supranational  space’,  he  is  compelled,  on  pain  of  theoretical 
extinction, to imagine a transnational or supranational state through which it can 
operate.
On his own account, though, the national state has adapted very readily to the 
neoliberal age, and is almost universally facilitating the activity of global capital. 
Indeed,  he  argues  explicitly  that  transnational  fractions  of  local  elites  and 
capitalist  classes swept  to power  in a number of  countries  in the 1980s and 
1990s,  and  ‘captured  the  “commanding  heights”  of  state  policymaking:  key 
ministries and bureaucracies in the policymaking apparatus, especially  central 
banks and finance and foreign ministries, as key government branches linking 
countries to the global economy’ [49]. As I shall say below, this is too simplistic. 
But the fact is that he does claim that ‘transnational blocs became hegemonic in 
the  vast  majority  of  countries  and  set  out  to  thoroughly  transform  their 
countries,  using  national  state  apparatuses to  advance  globalization  and  to 
restructure and integrate them into the global economy’ [ibid, emphasis mine].11 
If so, it follows directly that there is no need for a transnational state at all, and 
no  reason  to  predict  the  demise  of  national  states.  Robinson  has  been  too 
absorbed by banging his head against the imaginary brick wall of ‘state centrism’ 
to notice that his own argument demolishes the case for a transnational state. In 
sum,  Wood  [1999,  cited  p.  46]  and  others  are  right  about  the  continuing 
centrality of the national state, and Robinson [88-93] is wrong. And this in turn 
explains perfectly well what otherwise in an insoluble conundrum for Robinson – 
the fact that on the one hand the TCC is inchoate and the TNS only starting to 
take shape, while on the other the whole set-up is working like a dream, as if it 
were fully formed, to meet the needs of global capital.
I suggested just above, however, that his approach is too simplistic.  To the 
11 Typically, the same point is restated later, but supported by the opposite argument – that capital 
has abandoned rather than captured the national state, and the national state has responded by 
changing its orientation: ‘As capital became liberated from the nation-state and assumed 
tremendous new power relative to labor with the onset of globalization, national states shifted 
from reproducing Keynesian social structures of accumulation to servicing the general needs of the 
new patterns of  global accumulation and the TCC, involving a rollback of redistributive projects’ 
[74-5].
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constant detriment of the argument, Robinson is a thoroughgoing instrumentalist 
– in other words, he conceives of the state, whether national or transnational, as 
captured by and acting as an agent of the capitalist class. So at the national level
Once they have been captured by transnational groups, national states 
internalize the authority structures of global capitalism; the global is 
incarnated in local social structures and processes. The disciplinary 
power of global capitalism shifts the actual policymaking power within 
national states to the global capitalist bloc, which is represented by 
local groups tied to the global economy [50].
Robinson does not attempt to explain or even illustrate the mechanism by which 
this act of demonic possession takes place, despite its centrality to his argument. 
And as argued above, he cannot easily argue both that transnational capital has 
captured and is using national states, and that national states are in the process 
of being superseded by a transnational state because the needs of capital have 
changed. Worse, he overlooks the possibility that national states are not acting 
under the control of transnational groups, but instead are acting with relative 
autonomy from them to impose the disciplines of global competitiveness  on all 
classes, capitalists included [Cammack, 2006c]. This  is consistent with the view 
that national states are currently strengthened, encouraged and supported in this 
orientation  by  an  increasingly  closely  coordinated  network  of  international 
agencies and institutions. On this logic, there is no reason either to describe the 
network  of  institutions  around and beyond national  states  as  a ‘state’,  or  to 
expect anything more centralized to emerge. 
Robinson cannot grasp this,  because he is  the prisoner  of  a relentless  false 
logic:  capital  needs  a  state  to  act  in  its  general  interest;  capital  is  now 
transnational; so capital needs a transnational state. His lack of consistency on 
these  points  involves  him  in  a  fatal  contradiction.  He  states  that  the  TNS 
apparatus  has  already arisen  under  the  auspices  of  the  TCC,  and  that  the 
transnational  managerial  elite  which  represents  the  TCC  already ‘exercises 
authority over global institutions, and controls the levers of global policymaking 
[48]. The ‘transnational  ruling bloc’  is  already the agent of a revolution from 
above, ‘aimed at promoting the most propitious conditions around the world for 
the unfettered operation of the new global capitalist production system’ through 
‘modifications made from above in global social and economic structures through 
the agency of TNS apparatuses’  [77].  Yet this is  the very same class  whose 
boundaries are indeterminate [54], and whose existence is not yet proven. But 
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note, again: if we accept these claims, unsubstantiated though they are, there is 
still  no reason to believe that  a ‘transnational  state’  will  evolve in  any more 
concrete or centralized form that it already has. Whatever Robinson may say to 
the contrary, his argument requires  that the transnational state already exists.
It is not surprising, in the light of all this, that when Robinson finally tells us 
what he means by the ‘transnational state’ through which the global bourgeoisie 
rules,  it  turns out not to be a state at all,  but a loose yet all-encompassing 
conglomeration of global institutions, nation states, and other agencies:  
This TNS apparatus is an emerging network that comprises 
transformed and externally integrated national states, together with 
the supranational economic and political forums, and has not yet 
acquired any centralized institutional form. The economic forums 
include the IMF, the WB, the WTO, the regional banks, and so on. The 
political forums include the Group of Seven (G-7) countries and the 
larger group of 22 countries, among others, as well as the U.N. 
system, the OECD, the EU, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and so on [88].
Whatever else this is, it is not a state, transnational or otherwise. Yet Robinson 
goes on immediately to claim that the TCC (the very same one that is inchoate 
or  even non-existent)  ‘has directly  instrumentalized this  TNS apparatus’,  and 
‘has been attempting to forge a new global capitalist historic bloc’ through these 
global institutions. And lest we should mistake his meaning, he gives as his first 
proposition of his thesis on the TNS that:
Economic globalization has its counterpart in transnational class 
formation and in the emergence of a TNS, which has been brought into 
existence to function as the collective authority for a global ruling class 
[ibid].12
There is only one word for this: twaddle. And it should be noted that this is not 
a first rough approximation of the idea, but a considered statement of Robinson’s 
position,  maintained  over  a  number  of  years  [cf.  Robinson,  1998],  and 
juxtaposed to a passage which shows beyond question that the ‘TNS’ is neither 
collective,  nor  remotely  capable  of  exercising  authority.  What  evidence  does 
Robinson offer, then, in support of this unlikely proposition? Well, none to speak 
of. Instead we get a very pedantic lecture on nation-state centrism [88-93], a 
disquisition  on  Weber  and  Marx  [94-9]  which  touches  on  instrumentalism, 
structuralism and relative autonomy without mentioning, let alone qualifying, his 
12 Propositions 2 and 3 state that ‘The nation-state is neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing 
but is being transformed and absorbed into the larger structure of a TNS’, and that ‘The emergent 
TNS institutionalizes the new class relation between global capital and global labor’ [88].
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own claim that the TCC has directly instrumentalized the TNS apparatus, and a 
re-run through the component elements of the TNS, with a couple of new ones 
added for good measure [100-101]. Robinson then returns to the issue of the 
capital-labour  relation  and  its  management  by  the  national  state [102-10], 
repeating large chunks of material from earlier chapters, and again identifying 
the  nation-state  as  a  ‘fetter  to  accumulation’  in  the  latter  decades  of  the 
twentieth century before describing in great detail how it has since reinvented 
itself  in  such  a  way  that  ‘the  continued  existence  of  the  nation-state  serves 
numerous  interests  of  a  TCC’  [106].  And  we learn  here,  courtesy of  a  brief 
discussion of Proposition 187, that ‘national and local territorial boundaries and 
political  jurisdictions  that  in  the  past  may have  thrown up barriers  to  global 
accumulation have become functional to the globalized circuits of capital’ [107]. 
Leaving aside the suspicion that this smacks rather of ‘nation-state centrism’, 
let’s just say the conclusion offered above is amply confirmed: the TNS is an 
unnecessary theoretical construct. 
Let  me  offer  a  specific  example,  along  with  a  thought  experiment.  When 
Robinson eventually turns to ‘some empirical reference points’ for the emergence 
of a TNS, he tells a familiar tale – the emergence of global financial markets, the 
reorientation  of  IFIs  and  other  supranational  institutions,  and  the  shift  from 
welfare and developmentalist to neoliberal states. The latter section leads up to 
the following statement: 
Hence, far from the end of the nation-state … we are witness to its 
transformation into neoliberal states. These neoliberal states as 
components of a TNS provide essential services for capital. These 
neoliberal states, acting as transmission belts and filtering devices for 
the transnational agenda, function as components of a TNS. They 
provide essential services for capital within specific national territories 
[124-5, emphasis mine].
Now try the same passage again, but with the repetition and the references to 
the TNS removed:
Hence, far from the end of the nation-state … we are witness to its 
transformation into neoliberal states. … These neoliberal states provide 
essential services for capital within specific national territories [124-5, 
emphasis mine].
What have we lost? Nothing, I submit, except confusion, redundancy, crude and 
unsubstantiated instrumentalism – and the phantom transnational state.
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Setting Robinson straight
Robinson describes a world in which capital has already transcended the previous 
link between production  and territoriality,  in  which the national  ‘Fordist  class 
compromise’  has  already been abandoned, and in which national  states have 
already adopted a neoliberal orientation. It follows that if the ‘transnational state’ 
does not yet exist, there is no need to invent it. 
The switch that he needs to make, then, is not from ‘the nation-state and the 
interstate system’ [88] to the ‘transnational state’ but from the nation-state and 
the interstate system to the nation-state and the  global system.  He is right to 
remark  that  ‘the  nation-state  is  a  historically  bound  phenomenon’  [90],  but 
wrong to claim that it is  fated to depart the historical stage at this particular 
point in time, and wrong to substitute homilies on reification for analysis of the 
actual ‘complex, changing set of social relations’ [90-91] that current practice is 
creating. In the present era, this entails thinking of the national state not as an 
instrument or agent of capital, whether national or global, but in relation to the 
logic of  global competitiveness [Cammack, 2006c]. The re-orientation of states 
towards this logic certainly entails a re-orientation towards labour. But more than 
that, it entails the imposition of the disciplines of capitalist competition across all 
classes – on the working class, for sure, and not just on ‘national’ capitalists (as 
reflected in the ending of support for ‘national Fordism which he describes), but 
on capital  in general,  national  or not.  The fact that every one of the various 
bodies Robinson identifies as making up the TNS (p. 11 above) is focused on the 
reform and reinvigoration of national states should give him pause for thought. 
This  is  indeed  a  new  epoch  in  the  development  of  capitalism,  but  one  not 
dreamed of in Robinson’s philosophy. It is one in which states around the world 
are led, or driven, to offer ‘better climates for investment’ – one in other words 
in which states indeed no longer mediate ‘the boundaries between a world of 
different  national  economies  and  articulated  modes  of  production’  [10],  but 
rather compete directly with each other to offer the best site for accumulation in 
an integrated global capitalist economy.
To grasp what is really going on, then, Robinson would need to be more aware 
of the orientation over the last ten years of the international institutions he airily 
designates as agents of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ than he is. He would 
then notice that these increasingly coordinated international  organizations are 
seeking to advance capitalism ‘in its most developed form’ on a genuinely global 
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scale [Cammack, 2002]; that they are therefore not  so much instruments of a 
transnational capitalist class as relatively autonomous bearers of a broader global 
capitalist project [Cammack, 2003]; and that their energy has been devoted for 
over a decade not to imposing the ‘Washington Consensus’, but to seeking to 
devise and promote strategies for converting national states into viable agents of 
capitalist reforms at home compatible with competitiveness on a global  scale 
[Cammack,  2004,  2006c].  This  does  not  do  away  in  the  slightest  with 
‘competition between states’, but it changes its character:
In the context of the completion of the world market and the 
universalisation of the imperatives of capitalist competition, 
autonomous projects for capitalist accumulation secured at the level of 
the state – which, in any case, have been only briefly possible in a 
small number of countries in the past – are generally problematic. At 
the level of global economic management, this situation is reflected in 
the emergence of global regulatory agencies (international 
organisations), and regional and inter-regional initiatives sponsored 
and carried forward by state leaders in an effort to mitigate the 
difficulties they face in what they take to be their ‘national interest’. 
States naturally carry into this institutional environment their need to 
compete with each other, as well as their need to establish the general 
conditions for the global hegemony of capitalism [Cammack, 2003, p. 
40].
If Robinson could entertain the possibility that states have changed but are still 
central, the odd snippets he quotes directly from the remarkably few primary 
sources on which he draws for evidence of the reorientation of the international 
financial institutions and UN agencies would start to make sense. He would see, 
for instance, that when the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report states 
that  the restructuring of key state agencies ‘can mostly be achieved through 
executive order’ [123], and remarks that ‘globalization begins at home’ [125], it 
is  recognizing  that  the  national  state  is  central  to  the  project  of  building  a 
globally  competitive  capitalism;  and  that  UNDP  support  for  ‘entrepreneurial 
cultures  in  which  the  private  sector  has  historically  been  largely  absent  or 
underdeveloped’ [116] is not evidence of the UNDP acting at the behest of global 
capital, but reflects rather a broader strategy aimed at what it actually says it is 
– building strong entrepreneurial  cultures in  every country, or in other words 
promoting global competitiveness (Cammack, 2006a). 
He would then be in a position to see that it is  because national  states are 
envisaged as the lead agents in the process, called upon precisely to reform the 
‘cultural  and political  institutions  that  fetter  capitalism’,  or  in  other  words  to 
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institute  at national  level the conditions that  enhance global  competitiveness, 
that the objective of the international institutions and their allies in the G8 and 
elsewhere is to endow them everywhere, in the developed and developing world 
alike,  with  the  capacity  both  to  impose  capitalist  discipline,  and  to  secure 
legitimacy [Cammack, 2006b]. This is not a project that will necessarily succeed. 
But although there is no reason to expect national states to last for ever, there is 
no  immediate  alternative  candidate  to  play  these  roles  –  certainly  not  the 
imagined ‘transnational  state’.  Were it  not for  the fact  that  he is periodically 
dazzled by it, and permanently in thrall to a crude instrumentalism, he might 
have seen some of this. He might then have avoided the mess he is in, in which 
a state that does not yet exist is already a precision instrument in the hands of 
an already omnipotent  class  that  is  only  in  the early  stages of  a process  of 
formation. 
Conclusion
Little has changed since Robinson published the monograph that has been my 
principal focus here. He continues to insist on the need to deploy the concepts of 
transnational capitalist class and transnational state [Robinson, 2005a], and to 
see nation states as the effective agents of transnational capital:
historical analysis reveals that in the momentary conjuncture of the 
late 20th and early 21st century, transnational capital and its 
representatives did come to capture most state apparatuses around 
the world in a historically unprecedented way and to utilise these 
national state policy-making apparatuses to advance capitalist 
globalisation, including developing sets of policies functional to the 
global accumulation of capital [Robinson, 2006, p. 531-2]. 
At  the same time he accuses his  opponents  of  theoreticism,  in  the sense of 
developing analyses and propositions to fit theoretical assumptions, rather than 
to illuminate reality [ibid, p. 532]. In fact, the argument goes precisely the other 
way – it is Robinson who has stuck doggedly over a decade to the defence of a 
theoretical  position  which  is  neither  coherent  nor  empirically  grounded.  He 
should acknowledge that his own focus on the transformation of national states 
does not need it, and drop it.  In doing so, he would remove what threatens to 
become a major distraction from the task of understanding what is indeed a new 
epoch in global capitalism.
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